Social-psychological research reveals two opposite ways in which a person can respond to increased feelings of uncertainty in decision-making. First, he (or she) may try to reduce his uncertainty by searching for more specific information. This leads to less stereotyping and discrimination. Second, he may identify more strongly with a salient social group he belongs to (his ingroup, e.g. men). This induces him to rely more on stereotypic perceptions and prejudices, and hence to discriminate more against an outgroup (e.g. women). This paper develops a microeconomic model that integrates both responses in the context of hiring and pay decisions by an employer. The model determines simultaneous equilibrium levels of expenditures on screening of job applicants and ingroup identification. Increasing competition in the product market makes the employer feel more uncertain about his profits, but also raises the opportunity cost of screening expenditures. The latter rise elicits substitution of ingroup identification for screening expenditures, and hence enhances discrimination.
I. Introduction
In the last fifty years a rich literature on discrimination has developed in social psychology (see Fiske, 1998; Zanna, 1994; Hewstone, 2002, for overviews) . Some basic concepts in this literature, like prejudice and stereotyping, have been adopted in economics as well (see, e.g., Becker, [1957 Becker, [ ], 1971 Antonji and Blank, 1999) . However, a sizable reservoir of potentially interesting findings for economics have remained untapped so far. One particular combination of such findings is the following. When a person feels uncertain about things that are important for him (or her), such as being able to make a living, he is, under certain circumstances, inclined to identify himself more strongly with a salient social group he belongs to (his ingroup, e.g. men, natives; see, e.g., Mullin & Hogg, 1998) . In its turn, this induces him to rely more on stereotypic perceptions and prejudices, which can lead to more discrimination against members of an outgroup (e.g. women, foreigners).
A striking development in the Western world in which this psychological mechanism may have played an important role is that the upsurge of fear of terrorism after September 11, 2001 , seems to have led to more stereotyping and probably more discrimination against Muslims in the labor market ("we against them"). 1 As quite a different example, agents may feel uncertain when they have to survive in an environment of fierce market competition. This seems especially relevant for people in former communist countries in their transition towards a market economy. The psychological prediction of increasing stereotyping and discrimination then is consistent with indications that, e.g. in Russia, the old stereotype that men should have a job and women should stay at home has revived, while at the same time labor market discrimination against women has increased (Hunt, 1997) . Such a phenomenon may in particular play a role in relation to competition in the labor market: In regions within
European countries where unemployment is higher, stereotypic perceptions about the roles of men and women tend to be stronger, leading to a larger gender gap in unemployment (Azmat et al., 2003) . Boone et al. (2003) describe a comparable process in the newspaper-publisher industry, where powerful top-management teams become more homogeneous with respect to demographic characteristics when competition in the product market strengthens -by hiring demographically similar and firing dissimilar team members. However, social-psychological research also suggests quite a different kind of response to increased feelings of uncertainty. Tiedens and Linton (2001) conducted an experimental-psychological study on individual decision-making focusing on the effects of uncertainty-related emotions on information processing and stereotyping. They find that stronger uncertainty-related emotions lead to a more thorough look at the individual information at hand and less reliance on stereotypes. This is the rational type of response that an economist could expect.
Thus, two opposite responses to increased feelings of uncertainty seem possible. This raises the question under which conditions one or the other response will occur or dominate.
To answer this question, this paper builds a microeconomic model that explains both the psychological identification mechanism and the 'economic' response, and integrates them. It is formulated in terms of a simultaneous utility maximization with respect to ingroup identification on the one hand and a conventional economic variable on the other hand. The model addresses the way in which a risk-averse employer forms his expectation of the relative productivities of a number of equally qualified candidates for a position. He may base this expectation on individual information from job interviews, hiring tests, etc., but he may also use stereotypic information on the average productivities of groups candidates belong to (men/women, white/black, etc.). We then consider situations in which the employer starts to feel more uncertain about the level of his profits. This is assumed to make the employer more (absolutely) risk averse with respect to the uncertainty in his productivity estimates, which raises his utility loss due to this uncertainty. This evokes two kinds of response to reduce this utility loss.
First, the employer may spend more money, time and cognitive energy on collecting individual information on candidates (cf. Tiedens and Linton) . This rise in screening expenditure (cf. Altonji and Blank, 1999, p. 3190) raises the perceived reliability of the individual information, and hence induces the employer to give a higher weight to this individual information in his productivity estimates (cf. Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977) . As a result, the uncertainty in the productivity estimates, and hence the ensuing utility loss drops, and less use is made of stereotypic information. However, screening is costly, and this may induce the employer to respond to his increased feelings of uncertainty by identifying himself more strongly with his ingroup. This creates an "illusion of certainty" with respect to perceptions of group characteristics, which makes the employer perceive his stereotypic information on the average productivities of the ingroup and the outgroup as more reliable. As a result, the perceived uncertainty in the productivity estimates, and hence the ensuing utility loss again drops, but now more use is made of stereotypic information.
Thus, screening expenditure and ingroup identification are substitute means to reduce the perceived uncertainty in the productivity estimates of applicants, and hence the ensuing utility loss. The degrees to which screening expenditure or ingroup identification are used by the employer to reduce the uncertainty determines whether the use of stereotypic information in the productivity estimates will fall or rise. To investigate under which conditions one or the other will happen, we derive expressions for simultaneous equilibrium levels of screening expenditure and ingroup identification dependent on certain variables. Since social identification is more salient in group situations, we assume that the employer is the residual claimant in a production team (as in the classic entrepreneurial firm of Alchian and Demsetz, 1972 ) most members of which belong to the ingroup of the employer. In such a context the employer will easily identify with his ingroup, and hence use this identification to reduce uncertainty. This marginal benefit of ingroup identification is assumed to be balanced by a marginal cost from less personal identity ("depersonalization"; e.g. Turner, 1984) . The implied endogenization of ingroup identification represents a novelty of the model.
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A surprising implication of our model is that when the employer becomes more uncertain about his profits, and hence more risk averse, screening expenditure unambiguously rises, but ingroup identification may rise or fall depending on whether the marginal efficiency of screening expenditure in raising the reliability of the individual information is diminishing or increasing. In particular, this effect occurs when increasing competition on the supply side of the product market lowers profits, and hence raises the risk of bankruptcy. However, lower profits also imply a tighter budget for expenditures, and hence raise the opportunity cost of screening expenditures. This elicits substitution of ingroup identification for these expenditures as a means to reduce uncertainty. For a common power specification of the employer's utility function of profit, the resulting rise in identification is shown to dominate the counteracting 'economic' effects in leading to a higher use of the stereotypic perception for 'most' profit levels. Moreover, in the case where there is group discrimination, the discrimination coefficient of the employer rises as competition strengthens at sufficiently low profit levels. Competition in the product market then raises group discrimination even when there are no differences in real productivity distribution and in reliability of individual information between the ingroup and the outgroup, so even when discrimination is not rational from a profit-maximizing point of view. The counteracting 'economic' effects work in the same direction as the long-run selection mechanism in Becker's ([1957] , 1971) theory of employer discrimination, according to which employers with a zero discrimination coefficient drive employers with a non-zero discrimination coefficient out of the competitive product market. However, the psychological effect of competition may work in such a way that under competitive pressure even employers with zero discrimination coefficient develop a non-zero one over time. This would then imply that not all teams with non-zero discrimination coefficient would be driven out of the market.
Other economic models (e.g., of employee and customer discrimination, search costs, statistical discrimination, imperfect competition, self-fulfilling prophecies, gender differences in efficiency-wage effects, wage bargaining; see, e.g., Altonji and Blank, 1999; Coate and Loury, 1993; Haagsma, 1993; Rosén, 2003) are able to explain that discrimination can be persistent under strengthening competition in the product market, but only few of them predict that discrimination which is not based on differences in real productivity distribution or reliability of individual information between groups may even increase under competitive pressure. 3 More importantly, (almost) all economic models seem to assume that the extents to which employers rely on stereotypic perceptions and prejudice do not change when competition in the product market increases. Both social-psychological research and the empirical evidence mentioned above suggest that reliance on stereotypes and prejudices may become stronger when competition intensifies, leading to an increase in discrimination (cf. Shleifer, 2004) . Therefore, this paper endogenizes reliance on stereotypes and prejudices in a microeconomic model integrating social-psychological findings. Also, at the end of the paper we review some experimental and empirical evidence 4 and consider the impact of affirmative action.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II develops the model, which simultaneously determines the screening expenditure on a job applicant and identification with the ingroup. Section III analyses the implied effects of competition on discrimination.
Section IV reports some evidence, and Section V makes concluding remarks.
3 When there is a difference in variance of the productivity distribution or reliability of individual information between the ingroup and the outgroup, rising risk aversion as a result of increasing competitive pressure will raise discrimination against the outgroup (see Aigner and Cain, 1977; Hendricks et al., 2003 ; see also Cornell and Welch, 1996) . However, this is not the kind of mechanism that we model in this paper. 4 We then also shortly explain how increasing labor supply competition can raise discrimination. The focus of this paper is on the effects of product supply competition since for this kind of competition it is much less obvious that it may raise discrimination than for labor supply competition..
II. The model

A. Basic assumptions and relations
Consider a representative firm that produces one homogeneous good and sells it in a competitive market. The number of competitors in this market is large so that the firm is a price taker, but profits are still positive due to entry barriers. The internal structure of the firm is that of a production team one member of which takes decisions on, among other things, hiring and pay of new team members (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972 i is a normally distributed error term, independent of q i , with zero mean and constant variance . Furthermore, for ingroup as well as outgroup members q ) (u V i has a prior subjective probability distribution, which is normal as well, with mean equal to the stereotypic perception S q (different for ingroup and outgroup members) and constant variance (equal for ingroup and outgroup members). The posterior (subjective) expected value of q ) (q V i , given the individual test estimate , then is:
where (Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977 
Interpreting deviation as a measure of positive/negative individual (i.e.
within-group) discrimination, eq. (3) implies that this measure equals (Camerer and Weber, 1992) . Assuming that these two distributions are mutually independent, it follows then easily by substitution of
that the total variance equals the first-order variance (assumed independent of i) plus the second-order variance .
Variance can be said to represent first-order risk, while indicates second-order risk or ambiguity.
Rewriting eq. (2) in terms of the perceived reliabilities R S and R T yields the intuitively appealing expression
i.e., the extent to which the team members use their stereotypic perceptions in the formation of their productivity expectations equals the perceived reliability of this stereotypic information relative to the sum of the reliabilities of the two types of information. The following sections will show how R T and R S , and hence S, can change as a result of changes in financial-economic and psychological choice variables. 6 The two equilibrium wages are determined by equality of downward-sloping labor demands and upward-sloping labor supplies for ingroup and outgroup members. How is X determined by the employer? It is chosen at the level at which the expected marginal benefit of X for the employer is equal to its expected marginal cost . These and are implied by a general one-period utility function of the employer
Here I is identification of the employer with his ingroup. The first term on the right-hand side denotes the ex ante (i.e. before screening) expected value of the ex post (i.e after screening) Aigner and Cain, 1977; Hendricks et al., 2003) . This assumption may be justified by presuming that capital markets work imperfectly and/or that the employer does not like the firm to go bankrupt since he is committed to the firm or fears loss of reputation in the market of employers from bankruptcy.
The second term indicates the utility of general benefits and costs of I (see next section).
The productivity of the existing team is assumed to be perfectly predictable because of the knowledge of production levels of the existing team in the past (neglecting fluctuations). 9 Alternatively, risk aversion may be due to a negative dependence of profits on unpredictable variation in the q i of team members (cf. Aigner and Cain, 1977, p. 181) . 10 This utility should not be confused with the disutility due to prejudice in Becker's (1957) δ is a dummy equal to 1 when an outgroup member is hired and 0 otherwise, m is the number of candidates who are screened, and k is marginal capital and other costs. We assume that m is exogenously determined by a limited supply of equally best-qualified candidates. Besides its cost, X also has the benefit of lowering (see above), and hence of reducing the posterior variance (assumed to be independent of i).
To make this variance visible, we make a second-order Taylor expansion of around the ex post (i.e. posterior) expected value of (as usual in risk analysis; see, e.g., Nicholson, 1998, p. 223) .
Considering the ante expected value of this expression, we can approximate by and by , where , which is obtained by replacing by its prior expectation 
Further, making the plausible assumption that total screening expenditures mX are low relative to , we can approximate by its first-order Taylor expansion with
Of course, also some expenditure has to be made to select the set of (more or less) equally bestqualified candidates. This, however, is not included in X. 12 This is not equivalent to assuming a quadratic specification of since this Taylor expansion is only used as a local approximation of for (1) and (2) and
ex ante, can easily be shown to equal . In the present context of utility maximizing with respect to X, the second-order Taylor-expansion term in of can be omitted since it does not depend on X (see the next section for the case of I).
, and approximate by ,
Since subutility in eq. (5) does not depend on X, eq. (8) gives an expression for maximand . The second term of this expression represents the expected opportunity cost of the total screening expenditures for the employer in terms of utility. The last term indicates the ex ante expected utility loss due to the perceived risk of making mistakes in the individual productivity estimates . As indicator of this perceived risk serves the posterior conditional variance , which is related to the prior unconditional variance as (Aigner and Cain, 1977, p. 180) . Substituting eq. (4) and into this relation, it follows that
Substituting this expression into the formula for the expected utility loss in eq. (8), differentiating utility function (8) to X, and rearranging terms yields the first-order condition for an interior utility-maximizing level of screening expenditure X*
where R T is a function with . The left-hand side of this condition represents the expected marginal benefit at X* for the employer of higher screening expenditures per candidate X. It is given by the ex ante expected reduction of the utility loss 
Making the plausible assumption that there is a unique interior X* that fulfils the first-and second-order conditions, it follows that changes in exogenous variables Z that raise/lower ceteris paribus lead to a higher/lower X*, while changes that raise/lower ceteris paribus lead to a lower/higher X*.
This implies:
Consider, e.g., with
. This implies and with , which is negative if
Proposition 1. Assume a unique interior X*. Then
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Here
, i.e. Pratt's measure of absolute risk aversion. Its positive effect on X* can be seen from dividing both sides of eq. (10) by . While is a determinant of risk premia in terms of money, is a determinant of the utility loss due to risk, and can therefore be considered as a measure of absolute risk aversion in terms of utility. Thus, X* depends positively on , , product price p, marginal efficiency of X at X* in raising , and negatively on perceived reliability of the stereotypic information R
, marginal utility of profit , and number of screened candidates m. The next subsection will show how R
vary as a result of a change in ingroup identification I*. By virtue of ineq. (11) this will then also affect X*.
C. Identification and stereotyping
An interesting finding in social psychology that we want to incorporate into the model is that when someone experiences self-relevant uncertainty in the terminology of (one interpretation of) social-identity theory (e.g., Mullin & Hogg, 1998) , he is inclined to identify himself with a salient ingroup (e.g. men). Experiencing self-relevant uncertainty (SRUC) means that someone feels uncertain about things that are important in his life and for his self-definition, such as having a job or being able to make a living. This situation is aversive, and therefore people in some situations react by creating a kind of "certainty illusion" by identifying themselves with their ingroup, i.e., they depersonalize themselves and perceive themselves more as group members and less as individuals. Turner (1984, p. 528) describes the process and effect of depersonalization as follows: a "cognitive redefinition of the self -from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships and associated stereotypes". A certainty illusion exists in such a situation because group membership provides individuals with perceptions of right and wrong and standards of behaviour etc. This illusion diminishes their SRUC and, at the same time, induces them to rely more on stereotypes and prejudice in their decisions, because they now act as "group members" and not as "individuals". 15 This refers to the partial derivative of X* with respect to changes in at given (old) X*. *) ( ' X R T How do these social-psychological processes fit into our model? The basic problem is a suitable interpretation of the concept of SRUC in the context of the model. Let us start with some observations. First, SRUC is a perception accompanied by a negative emotion. Second, SRUC can increase in two ways: (i) the subjective uncertainty (UC) about important things may increase, (ii) the self-relevancy (SR), i.e. subjective importance, of the things one is uncertain about increases. This observation suggests to operationalize the concept of SRUC as a product of self-relevancy SR and uncertainty UC. Moreover, we can interpret the SR as the subjective importance of UC for the (overall) subjective well-being of a person. Multiplying this SR with UC then yields the perceived loss or gain in well-being due to the uncertainty, where the loss holds for risk-averse persons and the gain for risk-loving persons. 16 In the context of our model, the UC is given by the perceived-risk indicator (or ), and the corresponding SRUC is the ensuing ex ante expected utility loss as given by the last term of utility function (8).
This UC can be considered as selfrelevant since it implies, for sufficiently low levels of profits, a substantial risk of negative profits, and hence bankruptcy. Accordingly, for higher level of profits the SR would be low.
The expression for in eq. (8) implies that the SR of is equal to
, and so proportional to absolute risk aversion and product price squared (see Sec. III.A for more on this).
The previous section has shown that one way in which the employer can reduce , and hence his SRUC, is raising his screening expenditure X. However, this is costly, and in the given social context an alternative, possibly less costly means to reduce SRUC is raising one's identification with the ingroup I. The resulting stronger "certainty illusion" can be interpreted as leading to a higher perceived reliability R ) | ( 16 Strictly speaking, the psychological concept of SRUC only applies to risk-averse persons since it involves a negative emotion. However, by allowing the emotion to be positive it can be extended to risk-loving persons as well. 17 The approximations in the previous sections imply that we neglect terms in (see footnote 12), although this variance is reduced by increases in I (see below). However, since this ex ante uncertainty in the posterior estimates is resolved when the test estimates have been made, it does not really seem self-relevant and aversive, and hence will not induce the employer to create a certainty illusion by stronger identification with his ingroup. However, uncertainties in other variables that are here neglected as well will contribute to the employer's SRUC about his profit, and are therefore considered in Sec. IIIC.
q stereotypes (see above) it leads to a higher perceived reliability of the stereotypic perceptions S q as indicators of average productivity q for ingroup as well as outgroup members (see the decomposition of R S in Sec. C), and (ii) it raises the perceived reliability of q as an indicator of individual productivity for ingroup as well as outgroup members (so both the ingroup and outgroup are perceived as more homogeneous with respect to marginal team productivity).
i q 18 Thus, a higher I can reduce both the perceived first-order risk and the perceived second-order risk .
Just as in the case of screening expenditure X, we ask how the level of ingroup identification I is determined. To answer this question, we assume, in line with social-identity theory, that people have a personal identity and one or more ingroup identities. In some situations the personal identity, in others a specific ingroup identity is more salient. Accordingly, we define I more precisely as the degree to which a specific ingroup identity is salient as compared to the personal identity.
19 Hence, I is (analogously to S) continuously variable between 0 (zero weight of ingroup identity) and 1 (100% weight of ingroup identity and zero weight of personal identity). Moreover, we assume that it is not generally optimal in terms of individual well-being to identify fully with an ingroup at the expense of a zero weight of personal identity (I = 1). It seems more plausible to suppose that for a certain I* between 0 and 1 there is an optimal balance between ingroup identity with weight I* and personal identity with weight 1-I*. Important determinants of this optimal balance are the needs for reduction of self-relevant uncertainty and enhancement of self-esteem and distinctiveness, which are seen as additional motives for identification with an ingroup in social psychology (Hewstone, 2002; Mullin & Hogg, 1998) . In particular, the SRUC due to is reduced as I rises. In addition, SRUC due to other, profit and not-profit-related uncertainties is diminished as well by increasing I. On the other hand, there are marginal costs from "depersonalization", i.e., less personal identity, for which a psychological need exists as well. This leads to a balance of marginal benefits and costs of I, which is interrelated with the equality of marginal benefits and costs of screening expenditure X. This is modeled as the maximization of the employer's utility function (5) with respect to I and X. Again using
Taylor expansion (8), omitting the constant and rearranging terms, maximand is then given by
Here represents the utility of all benefits and costs of I apart from the benefit of reduction of SRUC due to . It is strictly concave (so ) with positive marginal utility for Thus, if there were no uncertainty , the employer would reach a psychological equilibrium at , at which his utility is maximal with respect to I. However, the employer also likes to reduce his SRUC due to , which is indicated by the ex ante expected utility loss term in eq. (12) next to . By raising I beyond its "base level"
each team member can increase , and hence lower the utility loss. The utility loss can also be reduced by increasing screening expenditures X, and hence , but this has costs that are indicated by the last term in eq. (12).
The first-order condition for maximization of utility function (12) with respect to I at given X can be written as ,
where the left-hand side represents the marginal benefit of I at I* and the right-hand side the marginal cost at I* of raising I above its "base level" . Since , is rising as a function of . The second-order condition for an interior I*, conditional on X, then implies that must be falling or rising less than as a function of I at I*. Making a second-order Taylor approximation , this second-order condition is easily shown to be always fulfilled (see App. A). Plausibly assuming that there is a unique interior I*, we then obtain, analogously to Proposition 1:
Proposition 2. Assume a unique interior I*, conditional on X. Then
The partial derivative with respect to now holds at constant marginal cost of I* in terms of money.
To derive the simultaneous interior X* and I* we should combine eqs. (10) and (13). The expressions for and on the left-hand sides of these equations are similar: in fact , where is the marginal benefit of raising either
Proposition 3. Assume a unique interior equilibrium (X*,I*). Then
for Z = , , p, and (10) and (13)) rise as well. This leads to an increase in X* conditional on I (Prop. 1) as well as simultaneous with I* (Prop. 3), and to an increase in I* conditional on X (Prop. 2), which is consistent with the findings in social psychology (e.g., Mullin and Hogg, 1998) . However, it only leads to an increase in I* simultaneous with X* if i . e .
if the marginal efficiency of X in raising falls with increasing X at X*. If , I* even decreases as risk aversion rises. This is due to the accommodating rise in screening expenditure X*, raising the perceived reliability of individual information
and hence lowering the perceived posterior uncertainty of the q ) | ( TV i of a new team member (eq. (9)). This lowers (eq. (13)), and hence leads to a lower I*. Since the curve is horizontal by approximation, the rise in X* is considerable, and will, when its marginal efficiency rises as well (raising ), even be so strong as to push I* back below its original level. Thus, the rise in X* more than fully substitutes for the initial rise in I* in reducing SRUC. This possibility of full substitution of X for I, but not the reverse, is due to our approximation of a constant . However, this is a plausible approximation (see the previous section), and in combination with the case where , it may be considered as a 'worst-case' scenario with respect to the effect of rising risk aversion on I*. This will serve to strengthen the robustness of our result of a positive effect of increasing competition on I* in Sec. III.
The interpretation of the other inequalities in Proposition 3 is straightforward. In comparison to the conditional effects in Propositions 1 and 2, there are now also positive cross-substitution effects and of rises in the marginal costs of I* and X* on each other's level, and negative cross-effects and of rises in the marginal efficiencies of I* and X* on each other's level. 
R is higher/lower than the relative rise in 
Note that the right-hand side of the inequality for is negative. Thus, only when is more negative than this expression
, a rise in risk aversion leads to a sufficiently weak increase in X* and a sufficiently strong increase in I* so as to cause a rise in stereotyping S*. The interpretation of the other inequalities in Proposition 4 is straightforward. The inequalities have interesting implications for the effects of competition on discrimination, which will be examined in Section III. 20 If with
D. Rationalization of discriminatory taste and group discrimination
(see footnote 13), it can be shown that ε , i.e. the absolute magnitude of the elasticity of with respect to X, should then be smaller than ½ if the absolute magnitude of the elasticity of with respect to I is not too much greater than 1.
As we saw in Section A, a rise in stereotyping S* leads to a proportional increase in individual statistical discrimination, but it can only imply an increase in group discrimination if at least one of the stereotypic perceptions SI q and SO q of the average marginal productivities in the ingroup and outgroup is incorrect. In the economic literature on discrimination (see, e.g., Aigner and Cain, p. 177) it has been argued that such incorrect perceptions are unlikely to persist in competitive markets since they lead to a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors with correct or less incorrect perceptions. Hence, either the incorrect perceptions will be corrected by learning about real productivities or employers with such perceptions will, in the long run, be competed away. However, the psychological literature on discrimination shows that even when real differences in q between two groups have disappeared, incorrect stereotypic perceptions of such differences tend to be quite persistent and widespread due to several psychological processes.
First, this stereotypic perception may be deeply ingrained in the mind of employers as a result of socialization and influencing by the media. Imagine, for example, the standard picture of the role of women versus men in the media. Relatedly, the stereotypic perception may serve as justification and rationalization of an emotional prejudice and the ensuing discriminatory behavior against the outgroup (e.g., Snyder and Miene, 1994) . This can be explained from the psychological inclination of a person to reduce cognitive dissonance between, on the one hand, his self-image (as someone who does not discriminate without a good reason) and, on the other hand, his discriminatory prejudice and behavior (Festinger, 1957; Arrow, 1973, p. 26) . As these processes largely work unconsciously, the resulting emotions and cognitions will not easily change. Quite a different kind of reason for the persistence of wrong stereotypic perceptions is implied by the social-psychological BIAS model of Fiedler (1996) . This model explains many so-called "biases" in differential perception of in and outgroups from the fact that ingroup samples are usually bigger than outgroup samples (e.g. the sample a male CEO makes of male versus female CEOs, but also the sample an economist makes of fellow economists versus social psychologists). Even when there are no real differences in distribution of the productivities q i between the ingroup and the outgroup, the ingroup is then perceived as having a higher q than the outgroup since the pattern of productivity-relevant attributes of the bigger ingroup sample correlates more strongly with the ideal pattern than the pattern of productivity-relevant attributes of the smaller outgroup sample does. 21 This represents boundedly rational information processing by agents who do not know how to make correct inferences from real-world samples about the underlying populations, and is a persistent phenomenon of human cognition. 
∆
, the discrimination coefficient relative to is relevant, where positively depends on p, and is even proportional to p when the labor supply of ingroup members is inelastic. The common factor in both cases is p, and hence discrimination coefficient D is defined as 
In this expression not only the extent of using stereotypic perceptions S, but also the size of the stereotypic overestimationS ∆ ∆ − should be considered as endogenous since social-psychological research (e.g, Lepore & Brown, 1999) suggests that not only S, but also prejudice, and hence via rationalization gives rise to a disutility of having O outgroup members in the team (assumed to be separable from utility function (5) "before rationalization"; cf. Arrow, 1973, p. 6 ). This implies a disutility of hiring an outgroup member (assumed to be diminishing in O), translating into the discrimination coefficient , which is the amount of profit an employer is willing to sacrifice to avoid the disutility . Hence, the disutility of , in linear approximation given by , equals , and so .
Furthermore, we assume that disutility due to prejudice increases with ingroup identification I as , where and for I higher than a critical threshold value ,
, and .
The underlying presumption is that only when I exceeds a certain minimum level , a discriminatory taste will develop, and then grow with I. Both and the level of may vary among employers (see also Sec. III.B). Substituting the expression for into that for and the resulting expression into
Thus, a higher equilibrium value I* of ingroup identification implies not only a higher S*, but, for , also a larger 22 Eq. (18) then corresponds to the taste for discrimination as conceived by Becker (1971, pp. 16-17) when he says that it incorporates both prejudice and ignorance about the true economic efficiency of the discriminated group. However, a difference is that whereas Becker states that ignorance that is not based on prejudice may be quickly eliminated by the spread of knowledge, we assume, in line with social-psychological insights of Fiedler (1996) , that such ignorance can persist due to systematic cognitive mistakes in the interpretation of information. 23 This is the negative of the marginal rate of substitution of profit for outgroup members (cf. Arrow, 1973, p. 7) . 24 An important component of this 'discriminatory taste' could be the disutility of a loss in ingroup identity of an ingroup member when he has to work with an outgroup member (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, p. 732) . It is plausible that this component increases when the identification with the ingroup I rises. In the case where the ingroup consists of men and the outgroup of women, a related component of the discriminatory taste may be the disutility due to violation of the social norm that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women (as measured in Eurobarometer surveys, see Azmat et al., 2003, p. 22 ; see also Vendrik, 2003) .
III. Effects of competition
A. Effects on I* and X*
What happens with ingroup identification I* and screening expenditure X* when competition on the supply side of the product market intensifies? Such an increase in competition is conceived as a rise in upward-sloping supply relative to downward-sloping demand in the product market near the equilibrium price p. This may be due to either an increase in the number of competing teams or a fall in demand. As a result, p, and hence expected profit (at given I and O S 0 Π 25 ) will fall. This has several effects.
At given variance in profits , the fall in will raise the risk of negative profits, i.e. of going bankrupt, for the employers. Intuition suggests that this will raise the selfrelevant uncertainty SRUC of employers. According to our interpretation in Section II.C of SRUC as the ex ante expected utility loss due to the uncertainty in
should then increase. For many specifications of utility function absolute risk aversion measure rises when falls, but not for all (e.g. for the additive quadratic specification remains constant). Moreover, the fall in product price p suppresses SR via the factor p
. This effect appears since the fall in p directly lowers the uncertainty in revenue from a new team member, i.e. less is at stake in absolute money terms. For the intuitively expected net rise in SR, and hence in SRUC, to occur, the relative (i.e. in terms of percentage) rise in risk aversion should be greater than the relative fall in p
. To see when this may hold, we approximate utility function by the common power
This implies . Empirical evidence is generally consistent with values of ρ in the range of -3 to -1 (Nicholson, 1998, p. 226) , and since the relative fall in is greater than the relative fall in p, it easily follows that for 
and hence SRUC, rises as competition increases. By the same token, the expected marginal benefits and of X and I in reducing SRUC, as given by the left-hand sides of eqs. (10) and (13), will rise as well. This arouses incentives to spend more resources on screening of candidate team members as well as to identify more strongly with the ingroup. (Nicholson, 1998, pp. 224-225) . For this function , implying that the relative rise in is even greater than the relative fall in p, but not necessarily greater than the relative fall in p
. Appendix B shows that for greater than total production costs C the relative rise in is actually smaller than the relative fall in The negative feedback of a rising I* on X* adds to the direct negative effect of a (20) with
, the negative feedback effect of a higher initial I* dominates for sufficiently low , implying falling X* simultaneous with I*, when competition increases. (4)). Estimates of the individual productivities of candidate team members are then purely based on stereotypic perceptions (eq. (1)).
Since this case of zero screening expenditure, and hence, e.g., no job interviews, seems rather unrealistic (see also the previous footnote), we will pay little attention to it in the following. . This represents an income effect of falling profits (Comanor, 1973) , according to which falling profits make it relatively more expensive to indulge one's discriminatory taste, and hence suppress the amount of money one is willing to spend on it.
As a result, employers will be more cautious in their stereotypic perceptions. App. B shows that, for the linear approximations made above and approximating for linearly as in eq. (19), this negative income effect on Thus, our psychological model offers arguments why increasing competitive pressure may not diminish and may even raise employer discrimination. This points to the importance of policy measures like affirmative action to alleviate this problem. Holzer and Neumark (2000) provide evidence for the U.S.A. that affirmative action has increased the number of recruitment and screening practices used by employers and has raised employers' willingness to hire stigmatized applicants. In the context of our model, the former increase can be interpreted as a rise in screening expenditure X* (cf. Antonji and Blank, 1999, p. 3190) as a result of an additional marginal benefit of X*. This extra benefit can be subtracted from marginal cost as given by the right-hand side of eq. (10)), and so has the effect of making X* less costly relative to ingroup identification I*. Consequently, X* rises and I* falls, which both lead to a lower use of stereotypes S*, and hence less discrimination. Thus, affirmative action not only raises screening expenditures, but also diminishes the need for identification with the ingroup.
X C C. Robustness
A limitation of Proposition 5 is that only the result under (e) (and (b) for holds for any specification of utility function with positive and diminishing marginal utility. To get an impression of the sensitiveness of the results to the specification of , consider the additive quadratic specification, which has quite different implications from those of the power function. When competition increases, risk aversion measure then remains constant, and hence, contrary to psychological intuition, SRUC falls due to
This argument should be modified when some teams in the market consist in majority of outgroup members (e.g. women) from the perspective of the dominant ingroup in other teams (e.g. men). Under competitive pressure these 'outgroup' members may identify with their own ingroup, and hence not develop a discriminatory taste against their own ingroup. On the other hand, feelings of inferiority or small-sample biases according to the BIAS model of Fiedler (1996; see Sec. II.D) may still lead to a stereotypic perception of a lower average productivity of their own ingroup as compared to the dominant group (see Schwieren, 2004) . These teams would then develop a rising discrimination coefficient against their own ingroup. (6)- (8) and (12).
Just like the utility loss due to , these utility losses are reduced by the certainty illusion of ingroup identification I, implying additional marginal benefits of I in eq. (13). By raising risk aversion, competitive pressure augments these marginal benefits as well, thus reinforcing the rises in I*, and hence in S* and D*, according to Proposition 3.
Another extension of the model is allowing hiring tests to be biased against outgroup members (see Sec. II.A). This complication can be shown to imply similar effects as found in the basic model. Finally, our model allows for the possibility that the outgroup is stereotypically perceived as having a higher, rather than lower, average productivity q than the ingroup. This may, for instance, occur when a group of women perceives a group of men as having a higher average productivity (see Schwieren, 2004, and footnote 32) . Increasing ingroup identification may raise use and strength of such outgroup-biased stereotypic perceptions as well, by reinforcing certainty illusions and feelings of inferiority, respectively.
IV. Experimental and empirical evidence
Evidence that is consistent with the model in Sec. II is (of course) given by the socialpsychological findings that we wanted to incorporate in our model (see Sec. I). In particular, the experimental findings of higher self-relevant uncertainty leading to stronger ingroup 33 On the other hand, these additional uncertainties may also lead to search for information to reduce them, which would diminish the reinforcement of the rises in I*, S* and D*.
identification, and hence to more stereotyping, prejudices and discrimination (see Secs. II.C and D), correspond to the case of zero or at least constant X in our model. An exogenous increase in SRUC (interpreted as the pertinent term in eq. (12)) at given I* and X implies a rise in marginal benefit (see eq. (13)), which can be associated with a rise in risk aversion . It is therefore predicted to lead to a higher I* at given X (see Prop. 2), and hence higher S*,
, and D*.
On the other hand, Tiedens and Linton (2001) find in their experimental study of individual decision-making that stronger uncertainty-related emotions lead to a more thorough look at the individual information at hand and less reliance on stereotypes. 34 In the context of our model this corresponds to higher screening expenditure X* and a lower use of stereotypes S*. Stronger uncertainty-related emotions are likely to lead to a higher risk aversion or a lower perceived reliability of the individual information at given X*. Both changes imply a higher SRUC (eq. (12)) and are predicted to lead to a higher X* at given I (Prop. 1). As far as I may have played a role in the experiments of Tiedens and Linton (the context of individualized decision-making made ingroup identification less probable), Proposition 3 predicts that I* will rise or fall depending on the sign of and that X* will unambiguously rise. As a result, use of stereotypes S* will indeed fall when is "not too negative" (Prop. 4).
To test the predictions of the model with respect to competition (Sec. III) an experimental study was conducted by for the case where 0 = X .
Equilibrium identification I* then rises as competition strengthens (Prop. 2). The experiments used artificial groups, i.e., "blue" and "red", following the minimal-group paradigm in social psychology (Tajfel et al., 1971) , and tried to generate a stereotypic perception A study by Schwieren and Glunk (2004) extends the experimental testing to a more complex situation, using a business-simulation game, where categories used are real, namely 34 See Tiedens and Linton (2001) also for related social-psychological literature on this subject. different nationalities (Dutch and German). In this case the stereotype that German students performed better than Dutch students was realistic, but it was dominated by a strong discriminatory taste of Dutch against German students when competition was perceived to be strong. Moreover, perceived competition correlated significantly positive with ingroup identification. This suggests that ingroup identification can indeed play a major role in raising discrimination when competition increases (see Sec. II.D).
In an extensive empirical study Boone et al. (2003) find that top executive management teams in the newspaper-publisher industry tended to hire more 'similar' team members and fire more 'dissimilar' team members when they had more power vis-à-vis the board of directors and competition from alternative media (particularly television) was strong (interaction effect). Similarity in their study is not related to sex or race, but rather to other demographic characteristics, namely age, career path, industry experience and academic status. A major force underlying this "homosocial reproduction" effect of competition may be identification of the members of a powerful team with their ingroup ("closing ranks" as Boone et al. call it) . This may have led to (more) discrimination against the outgroup. (1973) and Oster (1975) do not find market power in the product market to influence discrimination, and Baldwin & Johnson (1996) find evidence for discriminatory hiring even if it is obviously inefficient (in the presence of competition in the product market). Furthermore, Szymanski (2000) and Preston & Szymanski (2000) find evidence in the increasingly competitive English soccer league that there was employer discrimination against black players despite of clear performance criteria.
V. Conclusions
This paper has developed a model that integrates two opposite responses to increased feelings of uncertainty in hiring and pay decisions, as suggested by social-psychological research.
Employers may raise their screening expenditures on job applicants, but they may also identify more strongly with their ingroup. A simultaneous-equilibrium analysis showed that under certain plausible conditions the former response dominates the latter response, leading to less stereotyping and discrimination. As an application, the effects of increasing competition on the supply side of the product market were analysed. Strengthening competition makes the employers feel more uncertain about their profits, but it also has the effect of raising the opportunity cost of screening expenditures. This elicits substitution of ingroup identification for screening expenditures, and so enhances use of stereotypes, and hence discrimination. On a policy-making level, this calls for affirmative action to raise screening expenditures, and thus to diminish the need for ingroup identification among employers.
The main predictions of the model are reasonably robust to different specifications and extensions. There is experimental and empirical evidence that supports the implications and relevance of the model, but more research should be done to test the predictions. Perhaps, the main contribution of this paper is that it integrates an important psychological mechanism into a microeconomic discrimination model and shows how this mechanism can dominate the familiar economic forces. More specifically, social identification and stereotyping are endogenized within a microeconomic model, and this may be of relevance for all domains of economic life where these phenomena play an important role. , and substituting this in the second-order condition yields . Since , where h is the determinant of the Hessian matrix, which is assumed to be positive by virtue of the second-order conditions. Hence, the signs of and equal the signs of
Elaborating these expressions for Z that raise/lower , ceteris paribus, viz.
. Since (see above) and , the sign of 
